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Comments and Casenotes
INSURER'S LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO SETTLE
So numerous are the factors which must be assayed in a
determination of an insurer's choice between trial or settle-
ment that it would be impracticable here to attempt more
than a brief outline of them. Among the many elements to
be considered we find the temper of the people in the forum,
as it affects a jury, the size of prior verdicts in similar cases,
the standing of the plaintiff and defendant in the com-
munity, together with any bias which might find its way
in. Then, of course, the injuries of the plaintiff, and the
probability of total recovery must be weighed, and bal-
anced against the facts of the case along with an evaluation
of the ability of opposing counsel. As every case presents
a varied set of facts, so too are the factors varied which go
towards the insurer's final determination in any one case.
Nevertheless such decisions must be, and are made daily
by all the large insurance carriers, and as human frailties
exist, there as everywhere, mistakes in judgment some-
times arise.
However, it is not until a case has been tried and a ver-
dict rendered which exceeds the policy limits that there
comes into focus the insured's contention that a mistake
was made and that the insurer erred in trying a case which
it ought to have settled. His complaint, when presented
to a tribunal, is not merely that an error was made, but that
because of it he was damaged and he demands redress.
In such actions one of two allegations are made, either that
the insurer was guilty of bad faith in failing to settle, or
that his failure to do so was due to negligence. The Ameri-
can courts are not in complete accord in their decisions in
such cases. "According to the old majority rule, the insured
could recover the excess of a judgment above the policy
limits from the insurer, because of a failure to effect a
settlement for a smaller sum, only if the company was
guilty of actual fraud or bad faith .. . this bad faith rule
is tending to become the minority rule, being displaced by
the rule of negligence.. ."I It is a purpose of this comment
to discuss these two concepts, as they can be found pre-
8 APPLzMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND .PuACTIC (1942): Sec. 4712.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
sented in the cases, and through examination of each to see
whether they differ or are in accord.
Some little background will perhaps be useful here,
before the problem can be directly approached. The insur-
ance contract itself furnishes the basis for suit in all these
cases. The insured claims breach of some duty owed him,
and resulting damage, while the insurer defending says
there was no breach. It is at this point that we find the
negligence and bad faith rules springing up. It would seem
then that the first query should be as to the broad general
duty imposed on both insurer and insured by the contract.
After that is resolved, the other fine distinctions between
the conflicting rules may then more readily be drawn. The
National Standard Automobile Liability Policy2 will serve
as a convenient basis for study, as it is a typical policy.
It sets forth the rights and duties of both parties in much
the same manner as any of the other specialized polices in
use to-day.
Briefly the duties of the insurer are as follows:
"The ...................... company agrees with the insured,
named in the declarations, in consideration of the pay-
ment of the premium... and subject to ... exclusions,
conditions, and other terms of this policy:
1-To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease
... including death resulting therefrom.., sustained
by any person, caused by accident and arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
2-The company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging
such injury, sickness or disease, and seeking damages
on account thereof . . .; but the company may make
such investigation, negotiation or settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient; ..."
The terms of the policy dealing with the duties of the
insured provide that:
'The National Standard Automobile Liability Policy was drawn up by a
joint committee of the National Bureau of Casualty & Surety Underwriters
and the American Mutual Alliance appointed in March 1934. On May 15,
1935 the Standard Policy was promulgated to become effective on January 1,
1936. For full discussion see E. W..Sawyer, AUTOMOBILE LirmirrT INsuR-
ANcE (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1936).
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"l-When an accident occurs written notice shall be
given by or on behalf of the insured to the eompany
or its agent as soon as practicable....
2-If claim is made or suit is brought against the
insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the
company every demand, notice, summons... received
by him.
3-The insured shall cooperate with the company
and, upon the company's request, shall attend hear-
ings and trials and shall assist in effecting settle-
ments . . . and in the conduct of suits. The insured
shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any
payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense,
other than for such immediate medical and surgical
relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of
accident...."
Nowhere in this language can one find on the part of
the insurer an express promise to settle any case rather
than defend it. Instead it retains the option to settle if it
deems it expedient, and it is over the exercise of this option
that the courts have differed.
The policyholder on the other hand gives up all control
over the handling of the claim or suit against him, and is
forbidden, save at his own expense, to make any payments
to, or assume any obligations towards, the injured party
other than those as are imperative for first aid. These
restrictions are quite understandable. The company, hav-
ing agreed to handle all claims and suits, naturally desires
to be able to do it in its own manner, free from any un-
toward interference from the insured, be he well meaning
or not. The courts raise this point continuously in their
handling of these cases, 3 though usually it is used mainly
as a plus factor to bolster the decision whichever way it
goes. By itself it means little, but by using it as a lever, the
courts favoring the negligence doctrine impress on an in-
surer a duty not expressly undertaken, viz., that of exer-
cising reasonable care in its handling of claims and suits
against the insured.
The bad faith rule, followed by respectable authority 4
'Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N. W.
1081 (1916). See also, United States Casualty Co. v. Johnston Drilling Co.,
161 Ark. 158, 255 S. W. 890, 34 A. L. R. 727, 738 (1923).
'Noshey v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 68 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 6th,
1934); State Automobile Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 4th,
1948]
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has been defined as "the intentional disregard of the in-
sured's financial interest in the hope of escaping the full
responsibility imposed on the insurer by the policy."5 A
North Carolina Court hastens to add, however, that "a mis-
take honestly made does not subject the company to lia-
bility."6 In one of the leading cases supporting the bad
faith rule7 the defendant insured the plaintiff against loss
arising from injuries to employees. There was a $10,000
limit for each person injured. After a serious injury an
employee offered to settle for $8,500. The insurer's offer
of $6,500 was never increased and the parties went to trial.
The employer was never notified of the negotiations and
contended that he would have contributed the extra $2,000
to settle the case. At trial an $18,000 verdict and judgment
resulted. The plaintiff employer was thus required to pay
the $8,000 excess itself, and it brought an action to recover
this amount from the insurer. The complaint alleged negli-
gence in failing to settle, and plaintiff secured a verdict in
the lower court. The verdict was set aside, and this action
was affirmed on appeal.
The court brushed over the bad faith rule here with but
few words saying: 'a
"that the insurance company in the handling of the
litigation or in failing to settle is liable for its fraud
or bad faith is conceded"
but it then went on in the following vein:8
"... It has been held by this court that the company
is not liable on its contract for a failure to settle; a con-
tract imposes on it no such duty .... There is no im-
1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 591 (1939) : Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 65 Ind. App. 301, 115 N. E. 348 (1917) ; Abrams v. Factory Mut. Liabil-
ity Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 10 N. E. (2d) 82 (1937) ; Mendota Electric Co.
v. Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N. W. 61 (1928) ; Brassil v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 210 N. Y. 235, 104 N. E. 622 (1914) : Cleveland Wire Spring
Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, 6 Ohio App.
344 (1917) ; Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.. 173 Okla. 160, 46 P.
(2d) 916 (1935). See also, 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra, n. 1, for complete citations.
a Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 491, 1 A. (2d)
816, 820 (1938).
0 Wynnewood Lumber Co. v. The Travelers' Insurance Co., 173 N. C. 269,
271, 91 S. E. 946, 947 (1917).
' Best Building Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 247 N. Y. 451.
160 N. E. 911 (1928).
71 Best Building Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 247 N. Y.
451, 453, 160 N. E. 911, 912 (1928).
8 Ibid.
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plied obligation in the insurance policy in this case
that the company must or will settle according to the
offer made."
The opinion does not give a comprehensive discourse on
bad faith. No doubt it was felt a relative matter that can
only be decided from the facts at hand and not be solved
by rule of thumb. Many of the other courts, in accord with
this view,' say substantially the same thing. They then
pass on, with little discussion, having classified the particu-
lar acts complained of as either fraudulent or legitimate.
The Wisconsin Court, while following the bad faith rule,
felt obligated to attempt a more comprehensive definition
of bad faith than had hitherto been laid down. It said:' 0
"The good faith performance of the obligation which
the company assumed when it took to itself the com-
plete and exclusive control of all matters that deter-
mine the liability of the insured requires that it be
held to that degree of care and diligence which a man
of ordinary care and prudence would exercise in the
management of his own business were he investigat-
ing and adjusting such claims."
This the Court felt was the standard by which bad faith
vel non should be tested. At this point it is very interesting
to read a definition of negligence as given by Chief Justice
Rosenberry of Wisconsin in his charge to a jury." When
read in conjunction with the Hilker case above, it seems
that the Justice is defining bad faith in terms of negligent
conduct. This will be adverted to more fully further on,
and it serves at this point merely to point out that the courts
following the bad faith doctrine have tried to find a work-
able rule by which to decide their cases. In their search
9 Supra, n. 4.
iHlker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 12, 235 N. W. 413,
414 (1931), affirming 204 Wis. 1, 10, 231 N. W. 257. 261 (1930).
U Compare this but for a moment with Chief Justice Rosenberry's defini-
tion of negligence:
"Every person is negligent when, without intending to do any wrong,
he does such an act or omits to take such a precaution that under the
circumstances present he, as an ordinarily prudent person, ought rea-
sonably to foresee that he will thereby expose the interests of another
to an unreasonable risk of harm .... a person is required to take into
account such of the surrounding circumstances as would be taken
into account by a reasonably prudent person and possess such knowl-
edge as Is possessed by an ordinarily reasonable person and to use
such judgment and discretion as is exercised by persons of reasonable
Intelligence and judgment under the same or similar circumstances,"
Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 242, 234 N. W. 379 (1931).
1948]
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they have turned to the same type of standard of conduct
as we find them applying in deciding negligence cases.
Passing on now to the negligence rule, we find its
most outspoken and prolific champion in New Hampshire, 2
though several other states have seen fit to follow its lead. 2"
Stated generally, the rule seems to be that since the insurer
has absolute control over negotiations for settlement, it will
be held to that degree of care and diligence which a man
of ordinary prudence should exercise in the management
of his own business. If it fails to meet this standard, it
becomes liable to the insured for any excess judgment.
A recent case illustrative of the negligence view is
Dumas v. Harford Accident & Indemnity Co.'8 There the
plaintiff was insured under an auto policy, with limits of
$5,000 for any one person injured. He ran into a pedestrian
at an intersection and the injured woman suffered 33%
permanent disability in her left leg. Her settlement price
was $4,000 and the insurer's offer of $2,500 was never in-
creased. At trial she was awarded $12,000, and the insured
had to make up the excess $7,000. The insured then brought
action against the insurer, and he obtained a verdict which
was affirmed on appeal. The Court discussed the conflict
of authorities as to the liability of an insurance company
for negligence in failing to settle a claim. In this discussion
it pointed out that the bad faith rule is becoming displaced
to-day by the negligence rule.
Let us consider for a moment whether or not there is
any justification on the part of the Court for impressing
on an insurer a duty not expressly undertaken in the policy,
i.e., that of exercising reasonable care in its handling of
claims and suits against the insured. Casualty insurance has
had gigantic growth since the turn of the century. This is
indicated by the fact of a premium growth from 8.5 million
"Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Etc., Ins. Co., 240 F. 573
(C. C. A. 1st, 1917) ; Dusten v. Curtis, 74 N. H. 266, 67 A. 220 (1907);
Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 79 N. H.
186, 106 A. 604 (1919) ; Douglas v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 81 N. H. 371, 127 A. 708
(1924).
" Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Co., 86 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A.
7th, 1936) ; Auto Mut. Indemnity Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852
(1938); Tiger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 163 S. C. 229,
161 S. E. 491 (1931), later appeal in 170 S. C. 286, 170 S. E. 346 (1933) ;
Universal Automobile Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 54 S. W. (2d) 1061 (Tex.
Civil App. 1932), affd. 126 Tex. 282, 86 S. W. (2d) 727 (1935), rehearing
denied, 126 Tex. 291, 87 S. W. (2d) 475 (1935).
1*94 N. H. 484, 56 A. (2d) 57 (1947).
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in 1890 to some 1.9 billion in 1946,14 as well as by the great
increase in the number of operative insurance companies
during the same period. 15
Liability insurance at first presented a challenge to the
courts, for it tended to undermine one of the fetishes of
the common law, that of personal responsibility. The early
attitude of the courts was to construe all policies narrowly
so as to allow the insurer to assume only the least possible
part of the insured's common liability to third parties, con-
sonant with the policy terms. However, it was soon demon-
strated that such policy on the part of the courts wreaked
injustice on the innocent injured party much more often
than it accomplished any worthwhile end. All too fre-
quently the insurer was allowed to excuse himself from
payment because of a technicality and the injured party
then became the possessor of a worthless judgment against
the insured. It was with the advent of the auto that the
courts and legislatures both came to a clear realization of
"National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, Facts and Figures of the
Casualty Insurance Underwriters (1947) Table 1, Sheet 1:
Majtual Cas. Reciprocals Total
Year Stock Cas. Co. Cas. Co. and Lloyds Premiums
1890 .......... 8,450,301 146,253 None 8,596,554
1900 .......... 26,357,200 425,464 None 26,782,664
1923 .......... 424,228,318 62,749,729 37,597,898 524,575,945
1937 .......... 753,780,952 217,536,843 47,791,455 1,019,109,250
1938 .......... 739,842,813 214,704,529 41,970,629 996,517,971
1939 .......... 743,218,512 221,321,759 46,702,483 1,011,242,754
1940 .......... 781,266,569 239,745,481 47,894,040 1,068,906,090
1941 .......... 894,353,818 292,102,061 62,913,926 1,249,369,805
1942 .......... 991,189,480 341,063,364 68,140,302 1,400,393,146
1943 .......... 987,483,088 338,124,926 64,455,210 1,390,063,224
1944 .......... 1,053,502,656 353,016,848 69,389,670 1,475,909,174
1945 .......... 1,140,387,274 388,127,543 75,724,841 1,604,239,658
1946 .......... 1,398,150,024 487,705,078 99,063,697 1,984,918,799
8Supra, n. 14: Cas.
Stock Mutual Reciprocals Total
Year Cas. Co. Cas. Co. and Lloyds Companies
1890 ................... 23 5 None 28
1900 .................. 45 9 None 54
1923 .................. 121 121 72 314
1937 .................. 155 147 40 342
1938 .................. 158 140 39 337
1939 .................. 168 149 45 362
1940 .................. 165 144 45 354
1941 .................. 172 140 43 355
1942 .................. 169 139 45 353
1943 .................. 171 157 49 377
1944 .................. 176 160 51 387
1945 .................. 183 161 52 396
1946 .................. 193 158 53 404
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the injustice so frequently done. They saw that the average
person could usually find some means of procuring a car
and enough gasoline to run it, but that in most cases he
was utterly unable to respond in money damages for its
misuse. In an attempt to remedy such situations we find
many of the states passing Financial Responsibility laws 6
so as to make more probable some recompense to those in-
sured through the negligence of others. The insurance com-
panies are the institutions selected to make this reimburse-
ment. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that for
a price they offer their services in this capacity. Is it sur-
prising then, in light of these facts, to find the courts closely
scrutinizing all their dealings both with policyholders and
those injured? It would probably not be going too far
to say that today insurance companies occupy a position
approaching that of public servants, for certainly their in-
fluence pervades all fields of endeavour. In view of these
facts, can it be argued that an insurers duty to the insured
is only to refrain from acting towards him in bad faith?
The insured through his purchase of insurance has tried
to protect his own property so that if his negligence causes
injury to others the resultant loss will be absorbed by his
insurer and not fall directly on him. Clearly this purpose
is not effected if the company negligently fails to settle a
case and the trial results in a verdict over the policy limit,
leaving the insured responsible for the excess. Since the
company has control over all negotiations and may refuse
to accept any compromise offer within the policy limits
with the attendant possibility of a large excess verdict, it
is perhaps not unreasonable to require that the insurer not
be guilty of negligence in refusing favorable settlements.
With this foregoing treatment of the two doctrines a
rationale of the problem can be set up, together with a dis-
cussion of the difficulty inherent in any attempted separa-
tion of negligence and bad faith.17 It is well nigh impossible
to draw any clean cut distinctions between them which
really separate them, for we find the edges of the picture
so blurred that it is more than difficult to say where one
begins and the other ends. We find New York fully cog-
nizant of this difficulty in its rhetorical question: 18
"For complete list, see, Note, Automobile-Protection of the Accident
Victim, Survey of Financial Responsibility Laws (1942) 20 N. Car. L. R.
198, 202.
' Cf. those twilight zones of misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance
for difficulty in drawing any clear lines of demarcation.
"Supra, n. 7.
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"We may ask what would constitute negligence in
the failure to settle a case, as distinguished from bad
faith. Even when there was little likelihood of re-
covery many reasonable persons would think it wise
to settle rather than to take any chance with a jury.
In most of the accident cases, disputed questions of
fact arise. Is the insurance company to determine at
its peril vhether reasonable minded men would believe
the plaintiffs witnesses in preference to its own? Again
even on conceded facts, as frequently happens, a serious
question of law arises as to the nature or extent of
the liability if any. Is a jury to say that the insurance
company was guilty of negligence in choosing to try
out such a question in the courts rather than to settle?
These questions suggest the wisdom of adhering to the
contract of insurance which the parties have made.... "
In any case of this sort there are three possible factual
situations, as follows: first, there may not be enough evi-
dence of negligence or bad faith to enable plaintiff to
recover; second, the plaintiff may present enough evidence
to allow a judge or jury to say that the company was negli-
gent in failing to settle; and, third, there may be enough to
enable the court or jury to find not only negligence but
also bad faith on the company's part. All courts agree that
in the first situation the insured must lose and in the last
situation he will win. However, when we come to the
second possibility we find those courts subscribink to the
negligence rule allowing recovery, while the other oppos-
ing courts refuse it.
From the foregoing it appears that the courts feel that
there is some point of clevage between negligence and bad
faith. Yet when the opinions of certain courts having oppos-
ing views are studied it is very difficult to harmonize their
language with the result reached. We have already seen
how the Wisconsin court, while following the bad faith
rule, has so defined its position as to make it appear that
the ordinary concepts of negligence are to be applied in
order to supply a solution.19
Then, consider language from a Court of the opposing
school: 20
"It has been held that an insurer which assumes the
duty of defending a claim owes the assured the duty
Supra, n. 10 and n. 11.
Cavanaugh v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., supra, n. 12.
1948]
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of settling the claim if that is the reasonable thing to
do, and if the company fails to make any efforts to do it
the company will be held liable for an excess verdict."
Though the results are opposed yet one finds therein lan-
guage which might be transposed from the one opinion
into the other without causing any marked discord in the
final result.
These cases are but a few of the many conflicting
decisions but they serve to point up the inherent difficulty
of any complete separation of the two standards of con-
duct. How then can two such opposing views on the same
problem be justified or rationalized. It is believed that the
solution lies not so much in what the courts consider as
negligence or bad faith, but rather is dependent upon the
social philosophy of the forum, as set forth in the opinion.
That one is treading treacherous ground when going behind
an opinion is more than recognized, yet there seems to be
no other key to the problem. Some courts require less proof
than others in awarding a verdict. Those requiring the less
proof seem to follow a social policy of protection of the
insured, even at times to the detriment of the insurer; and
they find justification for the result by arguing that the
insurer who sells protection to the insured and then negli-
gently fails to protect his interests should be held liable to
him for any damage he sustains. On the other hand those
courts requiring more proof to make for guilt on the part
of the insurer refuse to interest themselves with the pro-
tection afforded the insured other than not to allow an
insurer to defraud a policyholder. Their position is stated
succintly in these words :21
"If the insurance company is to be obligated to
make a settlement under any given circumstances it
must be a matter to be dealt with between the insured
and the insurer, or else regulated by the legislature."
To date Maryland has never been called on to answer
the problem, and it will be interesting indeed to see whether
it will favor the old order or the new; but, regardless of
its decision it is clear that nation-wide accord will never
be achieved until the courts begin to base their decisions
not upon impossible distinctions between bad faith and
negligence, but upon the firm ground of the correlative
rights and duties between insurer and insured.
"1 Supra, n. 7.
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